

Manuscript Number: PUHE-D-14-00622R1

Title: Freedom and the State: Nanny or Nightwatchman?

Article Type: Review Article

Keywords:

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Order of Authors: Pettit Philip

Abstract: There are two rival images often offered of the state. In one the state serves like a nanny to provide for the welfare of its members; in the other it requires people to look after themselves, providing only the service of a night-watchman. But this dichotomy, which is routinely invoked in debates about public health and welfare provision in general, is misleading. What the rival images turn on is not competing pictures of how the state should function in people's lives but competing pictures of what it is to guard the freedom of its people. On the neo-liberal theory, which has been dominant over the last century or so, providing for people's freedom means leaving them to their own devices and fortunes. On the neo-republican theory, which answers to a much longer tradition, it means democratically identifying a common set of basic liberties in the exercise of which everyone should be protected by law and, if necessary, resourced. This older way of thinking about freedom has important merits missing in the newer and argues strongly against the night-watchman state.

09 September 2014

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To The Editors

Re: Freedom and the State: Nanny or Nightwatchman?

Please find enclosed the above manuscript, which I hope you will consider for publication in *Public Health*.

This manuscript discusses one of the main issues of public health, and of other public goods bears on how far the state should cater for the needs of individuals and how far it should encourage individuals to cater for their own needs. This manuscript contributes fresh insights into the history of rival ways of thinking about freedom and principles of government impacting population health.

This paper was written with the readership of your journal as the intended audience. The manuscript reports original research that has not been previously published and has not been submitted to any other journal for consideration.

I look forward to the opportunity to have this manuscript reviewed in your journal's peer review process. Please contact me on either 609.258.4759 or ppettit@princeton.edu if you require additional information. I look forward to receiving notice of your decision.

Yours sincerely,

Philip Pettit
Laurence S. Rockefeller University Professor of Politics and Human Values

Freedom and the State: Nanny or Nightwatchman?

Philip Pettit¹

Highlights

- One of the main issues in discussions of public health, and of other public goods, bears on how far the state should cater for the needs of individuals and how far it should encourage individuals to cater for their own needs.
- On the one side are those who argue for a nanny state.
- On the other are those who argue for a state that serves like a nightwatchman to guard against only limited dangers, letting people generally look after their own welfare.
- The conflict between these two views of the law and the state is often represented as a conflict between those who care primarily about the welfare of people, whether that is secured by people themselves or by their government, and those who care mainly about people's freedom and autonomy.
- A philosophically more challenging, and historically more enlightening, account would trace the divide to two different images of what freedom involves.

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Freedom and the State: Nanny or Nightwatchman?

Philip Pettit*

One of the main issues in discussions of public health, and of other public goods, bears on how far the state should cater for the needs of individuals and how far it should encourage individuals to cater for their own needs. On the one side are those who argue, as their opponents put it, for a caring, paternalistic — better perhaps, maternalistic — nanny state. On the other are those who argue, again in the words of opponents, for a state that serves like a nightwatchman to guard against only limited dangers, letting people generally look after their own welfare.

Proponents of the nanny state will tend to support restrictions on how far companies should be allowed to expose people to dangers like those associated with smoking and temptations like those associated with sugary drinks. Proponents of the nightwatchman state will tend to oppose such restrictions on the grounds that the state should not make decisions for its citizens as to what they consume; indeed it should not even make decisions for its children but rather leave the relevant issues to be decided by the children's parents.

The conflict between these two views of the law and the state is often represented as a conflict between those who care primarily about the welfare of people, whether that is secured by people themselves or by their government, and those who care mainly about people's freedom and autonomy. I think that this representation is misleading insofar as it suggests that those on the side of the nanny state have to be hostile to the idea of letting people make their own decisions and shape their own lives.

A philosophically more challenging, and historically more enlightening, account would trace the divide to two different images of what freedom involves. Those who lobby for the nightwatchman image of the state generally adopt what I think of as broadly a neo-liberal view of freedom. Rather than invoking a different value from

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4 freedom — say, the value of welfare — their opponents ought to argue instead that
5 there is a rival, more anciently rooted way of thinking about freedom — a neo-
6 republican conception, as I call it — that supports their insistence that the law and
7 the state should go beyond a nightwatchman role.¹
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12 In this short paper I sketch a history of these rival ways of thinking about freedom
13 and then I use that history to reconstruct the competing principles of government
14 that they would support. This reconstruction gives us an image of neo-republican
15 theory, on the one side, neo-liberal theory on the other, as philosophies for the
16 conduct of domestic government. And with those two images clearly in view, I
17 return in a brief conclusion to the issue between the rival visions of the state.
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24 *The history of neo-republican freedom*

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27 The older view of freedom goes back to republican, Roman days, and to the
28 enormously influential writings of figures like Polybius, Cicero and Livy. On this way
29 of thinking, which was to survive for two millennia, to be free meant to be a free
30 person. And to be a free person in turn meant that you did not have to live under the
31 will of a master; and that this wasn't just a matter of good luck: you were adequately
32 resourced and protected against being controlled by a master's will.
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39 How, according to Roman thinking, did you get to be a free person in this sense? The
40 general assumption was that all citizens — in effect, all non-enslaved, native men —
41 could expect to be equally free, at least in the ideal. And so the idea was that the
42 citizens of a society would be free insofar as two conditions were satisfied. First, the
43 law defines a range of choices — later, to be called the basic or fundamental liberties
44 — where they are individually able to act as they wish, without being subject to the
45 private will of another. And second, the law that guards them in this way does not
46 itself represent the imposition of a public will by a monarch or an aristocracy or a
47 colonial power: it is framed on terms that the citizens collectively impose on their
48 government.
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58 This conception of what it is to enjoy freedom meant that there are two ways in
59 which you might be un-free. One, by being subject to the private will of another, as
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4 in being the slave of a master or a woman subject to her husband's will. Two, by
5 living under a law that is imposed at the will of a particular person or party, not
6 under a law that, together with other citizens, you have a part in shaping. The Latin
7 word for subjection to the will of another — subjection to a master or *dominus* —
8 was *dominatio*, which we may translate as 'domination'.² And so the idea was that
9 freedom requires the absence both of private and of public domination.

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11 One of the striking themes in this Roman conception of freedom was the insistence
12 that if you are subject to someone else's domination — if their will is paramount in
13 the area, roughly, of your basic liberties — then that makes you un-free, even if the
14 master in your life is entirely good-willed and inclined to let you choose in that area
15 according to your own wishes. Thus Roman comedies made fun of the figure of the
16 slave who thought he was free because his master was gentle or gullible or just
17 often away.³ And those who later followed the Roman, republican way of thinking
18 always maintained that to live under a law that was subject even to a wholly
19 benevolent despot was to live in un-freedom; in order to live in freedom the law had
20 to be a public affair — a *res publica* — not something in the control of any private or
21 foreign power.

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23 This way of thinking about freedom identified it, therefore, with the enjoyment of
24 both private and public non-domination. Although it continued to command lip-
25 service, freedom as non-domination ceased to have much relevance in Rome after
26 the rise of the Empire at the beginning of the common era. But it regained a
27 powerful presence in public life with the rise of the city-states of northern Italy —
28 Venice, Florence, Siena, Perugia and the like — a thousand years later, in the high
29 middle ages.

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31 The burghers of these new trading centers had generally thrown off the control of
32 local lords by the late twelfth century and began at the point to cast themselves as
33 citizens in the Roman mould. They insisted that living under a law that was of their
34 own collective making, and being each protected in an individual sphere of choice by
35 that law — being secured in their basic liberties — they enjoyed exactly the sort of
36 freedom that the Romans cherished. And since their trading centers became the
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4 great centers of learning in the Renaissance period, they bequeathed this neo-
5 Roman way of thinking about freedom to the northern European countries in the
6 1500's and 1600's.
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10 The legacy of republican thinking that these northern countries inherited led in
11 many cases to constitutional upheavals. It shaped the republic of the nobles in
12 Poland, it inspired the Dutch republic that was formed after the expulsion of the
13 Spanish, and it fuelled the revolution that led to the English republic of the 1640's
14 and 1650's. Thomas Hobbes, an opponent of the English revolution, railed at this
15 'false show of liberty', remarking famously that 'there was never anything so dearly
16 bought as these western parts have bought the learning of the Greek and Latin
17 tongues'.⁴
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21 The republican conception of freedom that inspired these upheavals remained in
22 common currency in the English-speaking world, even after the restoration of
23 Charles II in 1660. Indeed, with the introduction of a broadly constitutional
24 monarchy after 1688 — a monarchy that was no longer seen as necessarily inimical
25 to republican freedom — it achieved the status of an orthodox ideal in most strains
26 of political thinking. Freedom in this sense consists in 'independency upon the will
27 of another', as Algernon Sidney put it in the 1680's.⁵ Or as the idea was formulated
28 in Cato's Letters, a radical tract of the 1700's, 'Liberty is, to live upon one's own
29 terms; slavery is, to live at the mere mercy of another'.⁶
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33 In this way of thinking, true to its Roman origins, you were un-free even if your
34 master or lord was entirely good-willed. As Sidney wrote, 'he is a slave who serves
35 the best and gentlest man in the world, as well as he who serves the worst'.⁷ And
36 that message was taken, not just to rule against the private domination of a gentle
37 individual master, but also against the public domination of a gentle colonial master.
38 Writing in the 1770's, the radical clergyman and mathematician, Richard Price,
39 emphasized the point forcefully. 'Individuals in private life, while held under the
40 power of masters, cannot be denominated free, however equitably and kindly they
41 may be treated. This is strictly true of communities as well as of individuals'.⁸
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4 The republican conception of freedom as non-domination reached perhaps the
5 greatest height of influence about the time of the American war of independence.
6 One of the things that had really upset the American colonists is that in 1766 when
7 the Westminster Parliament had been persuaded to withdraw the tax imposed by
8 the Stamp Act, it went out of its way to claim that, although choosing to exercise
9 indulgence, it enjoyed as 'of right' the 'full power and authority to make laws and
10 statutes' binding the Americans. This was just to say that it claimed the position of a
11 master, albeit a kindly master. And if that claim was admitted then, by the received
12 ideal, the American colonists could not count as free. Despite the existence of literal
13 slaves in the American lands, this led to a general complaint among the colonists, in
14 the words of a 1772 resolution in Boston, that 'we are degraded from the rank of
15 Free Subjects to the despicable Condition of Slaves'.⁹

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17 And now we confront one of the great ironies in the history of political thought. At
18 just the time when the republican conception of freedom attained its greatest
19 influence, sparking a successful war of independence in the American colonies, an
20 alternative conception made an appearance and quickly gained currency, even
21 dominance. This is the conception that came to be identified as classical liberal in
22 character and that we today would naturally describe as neo-liberal or liberatarian.

23 *The history of neo-liberal freedom*

24
25 In 1776, Richard Lind, a pamphleteer writing on behalf of the British Prime Minister,
26 Lord North, first introduced the new idea of freedom. Freedom is 'nothing more or
27 less than the absence of coercion', he said, ascribing this idea, wholly inimical to
28 received ideas, to 'a very worthy and ingenious friend'. But that means, he then
29 pointed out, that since 'all laws are coercive', the laws themselves take from people's
30 liberty, even if they do so in the hope of reducing the overall level of coercion. And if
31 that is the case, he asked, what is the complaint of the Americans? They are ruled by
32 law, to be sure, but so are those in mainland Britain and so indeed are those in any
33 society whatsoever.¹⁰

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4 Where the earlier view had depicted freedom as the product of a protective,
5 popularly controlled law, this view makes law into the antonym of freedom: a form
6 of coercion, whether of body or will, that reduces the choices available to subjects.
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8 This is indeed a new view, as the worthy friend had claimed in a letter to Lind. The
9 friend was Jeremy Bentham and in that letter he reported 'a kind of discovery I had
10 made, that the idea of liberty...was merely a negative one', and should be defined as
11 'the absence of restraint'.¹¹ Bentham's view of freedom may have appeared briefly in
12 Hobbes, whether or not he was aware of the fact, but he gave it a sharper definition
13 and a greater importance, making it into 'the cornerstone of my system', as he put it
14 in the letter.
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18 This novel view of freedom was useful for Lind and others in rejecting the
19 republican argument against colonialism, even the supposedly gentle colonialism of
20 Westminster in relation to the American colonists. But it probably survived because
21 it also served other purposes in the thinking of Bentham and his utilitarian
22 associates, and in the thinking of a new movement that came to be known as
23 classical liberalism.
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27 Bentham himself was a reformer, committed broadly to an inclusive view of the
28 citizenry, and the new view of freedom was useful in allowing him to argue that the
29 law should cater for the equal freedom of all, without seeming to call for a complete
30 overturning of the status quo. To have called for the equal non-domination of all,
31 women and workers included, would have been utterly radical, requiring the
32 transformation of existing family and master-servant law. But to call for equal non-
33 coercion or non-interference was not at all so revolutionary. It was possible that a
34 wife or worker could be as free in this sense as the master, notwithstanding their
35 subjection to his will, provided that the master stayed his hand and did not actually
36 impose interference.
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40 One prominent utilitarian of the time was William Paley, who exercised a great
41 influence over moral and religious thinking in nineteenth century Britain. He
42 adopted the new view of freedom in a book published in 1785 that became a
43 required part of the Cambridge syllabus and remained so down to 1925. In making
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4 the case for what he cast as a novel view — it jars, he admitted, with ‘the usage of
5 common discourse’ — he acknowledged that nothing more than freedom in this
6 new, downgraded sense could be established for all. Thus he contrasted it with
7 those accounts of freedom, such as the republican, ‘which, by making that essential
8 to civil freedom which is unattainable in experience, inflame expectations that can
9 never be gratified, and disturb the public content with complaints, which no wisdom
10 or benevolence of government can remove’.¹²

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18 The new conception of freedom as non-interference or non-coercion may have
19 appealed to the likes of Bentham and Paley for making it possible to be relatively
20 egalitarian without being utterly radical. But it appealed to classical liberals for the
21 fact that it provided a way of justifying the new legal and political order that
22 industrialization was calling into existence. In this new order, great numbers of
23 people moved off the land and, with growing industrialization, scrambled for
24 subsistence jobs in the mines, mills and factories, in various cottage industries, and
25 in the construction of the canals and railways. The conditions of most workers were
26 appalling, even by standards current at the time, and a question that naturally arose
27 was whether the people who endured such conditions could count as free.

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37 The new way of thinking suggested that they could. They may have been subjected
38 to their new masters in the manner of ‘wage slaves’, as many adherents of the older
39 republican way of thinking insisted.¹³ And they may have been forced by fear of
40 death or destitution to accept the conditions of industrial labor. But they were not
41 strictly coerced — they were not gang-pressed or threatened — into submission.
42 They made an un-coerced decision to work on the terms their employers offered,
43 even if they had little option but to accept those terms. They enjoyed what was
44 celebrated by classical liberals as freedom of contract: freedom to decide on who to
45 work for, on what terms, and under what conditions.

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54 The republican notion of freedom had focused on the freedom of each person, and
55 on the requirements it put in place for reducing any private or public domination.
56 The newer notion shifted the focus to choice, suggesting that the free society is one
57 where relations are organized, so far as possible, on the basis of negotiation,
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4 contract and consent. No matter that such a society is likely to display great
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6 inequality, to impose conditions on many where their choices are driven by fear and
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8 need, and to give some the position of masters in relation to others. It still answers
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10 broadly to classical liberal requirements. It satisfies the mantra, for example, that
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12 Robert Nozick formulated in defending a version of the approach: 'From each as
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14 they choose, to each as they are chosen'.¹⁴

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16 With the shift to a focus on the free choice rather than the free person, the new
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18 theory of freedom moved concern away from domination, whether private or public
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20 in character. It did not matter in this view that you lived under the private
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22 domination of a master, provided the master dealt with you contractually and did
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24 not impose any actual coercion. And it did not matter in this view that you lived
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26 under the public domination of government. The coercion of government is
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28 acceptable, however undemocratic, to the extent that it restricts private coercion,
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30 facilitates contract and choice, and is kept to the minimal level required for those
31
32 purposes. Thus William Paley argued that if it operated in this pattern 'an absolute
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34 form of government' would be 'no less free than the purest democracy'.¹⁵

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36 The shift of focus from person to choice had enormous ramifications for how to
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38 conceive of the relation between government or law on the one hand and the
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40 freedom of individuals on the other. In the older conception it was government and
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42 law that made freedom possible and accessible for citizens. In the newer it was the
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44 contractual free-for-all of the market that made freedom possible. To the extent that
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46 government and law went beyond the maintenance of market conditions, then, it
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48 took away from people's freedom rather than enhancing it. In this new vision, as
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50 Ronald Regan put it two hundred years later, government is the problem, not the
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52 solution.

53 54 55 *Neo-republicanism and neo-liberalism*

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57 What would these two ideals of liberty support as principles for the conduct of
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59 government in a contemporary society? I assume that each approach would be
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4 inclusive in recognizing as full citizens all the adult, able-minded, more or less
5 permanent residents of the society. I say nothing on how far it should be ready to
6 accept would-be immigrants and refugees into the ranks of the citizenry.¹⁶ And
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8 equally I say nothing on how it would argue for the treatment of children or of those
9 who are not able-minded. Those issues are beyond my brief.

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14 There are two aspects under which any philosophy of government will dictate
15 principles for the organization of society and they can be cast roughly as social
16 justice, on the one side, and democratic justice on the other. A society will be socially
17 just to the extent that it organizes relations between individuals and the corporate
18 bodies that individuals constitute in a way that treats all citizens as equals. And a
19 society will be democratically just to the extent that it organizes relations between
20 citizens and the government that rules over them in a way that treats them as equals.
21 Every philosophy of government gives its own account of what it is for citizens to
22 enjoy treatment as equals and each applies that account to the horizontal relations
23 of people to one another — the subject of social justice — and to their vertical
24 relations to their government: the subject of democratic justice.
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35 The principles of a neo-republican philosophy of government are readily formulated,
36 in light of our brief history of the ideal it sponsored.
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39 1. *Social Justice:*

40 The law should identify a common set of basic liberties and enable each to
41 exercise those liberties without private domination by others.
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44 2. *Democratic Justice:*

45 This law should be framed and implemented by government under a form of
46 popular control that guards against public domination.
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51 What are these principles going to support in practice? The principle of social justice
52 is obviously going to require institutions, supported under law, that provide each
53 citizen with a range of security: basic security against aggression, of course, but also
54 educational security, social security, medical security, judicial security, workplace
55 security and the shared securities associated with provisions for food reliability,
56 public health, environmental sustainability, and indeed the defense of the country.
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4 How far should the state secure people in these and other areas? An established
5 republican theme can be of help here. This is the age-old association between being
6 a free, un-dominated person and being able to look others in the eye without reason
7 for fear or deference. If the law can deliver a world that passes or comes close to
8 passing this eyeball test of social justice, then it ought to appeal to the most
9 demanding amongst us. That world may allow for material inequalities and it may
10 have to restrict some individual securities for the sake of the system overall: for
11 example, it may have to reduce workplace security in order to increase employment.
12 But it will still deliver a palpable and palpably attractive ideal.

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21 What does the neo-republican principle of democratic justice require? There is more
22 to be said in this context than is possible here but it should suffice to point out some
23 of the more obvious preconditions: an electoral system in which each has an equal
24 part; a parliamentary system in which the executive is held properly to account; a
25 strict separation of judicial from other power; a system in which decisions where
26 elected officials have a special interest are put at arm's length from parliament; a
27 campaign system in which politicians do not have to put themselves in the debt of
28 the wealthy; a balanced media that operates under a guarantee of freedom of
29 information; a lobby system in which the grounds and modes of pressure exerted
30 upon government are forced into the public eye; a system of contestation, formal
31 and otherwise, in which all may play an uninhibited part; and a network of public-
32 interest, watchdog bodies that can keep government on its toes.

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44 And now consider the corresponding principles that a neo-liberal philosophy would
45 support.

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48 1. *Social Justice:*

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50 The law should establish a market that facilitates contract and choice,
51 imposing the minimal system of coercive protection that this requires.

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53 2. *Democratic Justice:*

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55 This law should be controlled in such a way — presumptively, in such a
56 democratic way — that people's contractual freedom is maximized .
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4 These principles point in a very different direction from their neo-republican
5 counterparts. The principle of social justice would support a minimal state
6 apparatus for ensuring law and order and within that framework it would argue for
7 letting the market go where it will, even should this lead to extreme inequality, great
8 imbalances of power, and multiple sites of domination. What remedies should apply
9 in cases where the market does not lift the destitute or dependent out of their
10 penury? The answer often proposed is: the remedies to be provided by the private
11 philanthropy of the rich. Even if it fosters domination, as the haves lord it over the
12 have-nots, philanthropy will ensure the satisfaction of Nozick's principle: from each
13 as they choose, to each as they are chosen.
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23 Where does the neo-liberal principle of democratic justice point? As Paley already
24 noticed, and as those advocating China's neo-liberal reforms are well aware, it does
25 not strictly require democracy. All that it requires is that system, whatever it is, that
26 most reliably delivers the market-centred vision of social justice. In his "Essay on
27 Man", Alexander Pope may best articulate the bottom line: 'For Forms of
28 Government let fools contest. Whatever is *best administered is best*'. To be fair, many
29 neo-liberals strongly believe that democracy is likely to be essential for the well-
30 ordered market society that they cherish. But the linkage that they make to
31 democracy is still much weaker than in the alternative picture and, apart from
32 supporting the independence of the judiciary, it offers little in the way of
33 specifications for how democracy itself should be ordered.
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44 *Back to the issue*

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47 Once we put up the two ideals of freedom, neo-liberal and neo-republican, and once
48 we identify the rival philosophies of government that they describe, we gain a good
49 vantage point for considering whether the state ought to assume the profile of a
50 nanny or a nightwatchman.
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55 The neo-republican view argues for allowing the state to do a great deal in
56 establishing a framework within which people can make their own lives, carving out
57 the areas where they can enjoy personal sovereignty. The framework it supports
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4 might certainly restrict initiatives on the part of some that would put public health
5 or any other public good at risk; for example, it might well argue for imposing
6 serious regulations and restrictions on the food industry. But it would not do this in
7 the cause of molly-coddling people who are presumed to be unable to look after
8 themselves. And so it would not fall foul of the usual rhetoric and criticism that is
9 deployed by neo-liberals.
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16 The neo-republican view would argue that a relatively interventionist framework is
17 an essential part of the infrastructure of people's freedom: that is, their freedom as
18 un-dominated citizens, competent and secure in the exercise the basic liberties
19 protected by law. Moreover, it would support that framework only insofar as the
20 arrangement passed democratic muster, attracting electoral support and surviving
21 the interrogation of various public-interest bodies — for example, various consumer
22 groups — in an active civil society.
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30 It is important to be able to make the case for such state interventions on the basis
31 of the ideal of freedom. With the language of freedom figuring on both sides of the
32 debate between the two visions of the state, it becomes possible to make a fair
33 assessment of the two philosophies. The issue is no longer one of whether we
34 challenge people, as neo-liberals would put it, or condescend to them. The issue is
35 between rival ideals of freedom. Should we be primarily concerned with people's
36 enjoying the status of equal, un-dominated individuals in their relations with one
37 another? Or should we strive for a society that allows maximally unrestricted
38 choice, whatever the consequences for people's relative standing: for example,
39 whatever the consequences for the relations of domination between them?
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49 I do not pretend to be able to resolve that question in the short compass of this
50 paper. But I imagine it is clear where my own sympathies lie. And I would like to
51 think that it is clear where the sympathies of detached observers ought to take
52 them.
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58 ¹ For an elaboration of this rival view of freedom see Pettit, P. (1997). Republicanism: A
59 Theory of Freedom and Government. Oxford, Oxford University Press; Skinner, Q. (1998).
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Liberty Before Liberalism. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press; Pettit, P. (2014). Just Freedom: A Moral Compass for a Complex World. New York, W.W.Norton and Co.

² On this notion see the appendix in Lovett, F. (2010). A General Theory of Domination and Justice. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

³ See Skinner Liberty before Liberalism, in his discussion of the figure of Tranio in Plautus's play, Mostellaria.

⁴ Hobbes, T. (1994). Leviathan. ed E.Curley. Indianapolis, Hackett, Ch 21.

⁵ Sidney, A. (1990). Discourses Concerning Government. Indianapolis, Liberty Classics, 17.

⁶ Trenchard, J. and T. Gordon (1971). Cato's Letters. New York, Da Capo, Vol 2, 249-50.

⁷ Discourses Concerning Government, 441.

⁸ Price, R. (1991). Political Writings. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 77-78.

⁹ Reid, J. P. (1988). The Concept of Liberty in the Age of the American Revolution. Chicago, Chicago University Press, 92.

¹⁰ Lind, J. (1776). Three Letters to Dr Price. London, T. Payne, 24 and 17.

¹¹ Long, D. C. (1977). Bentham on Liberty. Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 54.

¹² Paley, W. (1825). The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, Vol 4, Collected Works. London, C. and J. Rivington, 357 and 359.

¹³ Sandel, M. (1996). Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 172-74.

¹⁴ Nozick, R. (1974). Anarchy, State, and Utopia. Oxford, Blackwell, 160.

¹⁵ Paley The Principles of Moral and Political Philosophy, 166.

¹⁶ See Pettit Just Freedom for a more comprehensive overview of the dictates of neo-republican principles both in domestic and international contexts.

